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1. Introduction 
 
The dilemma of conservation and development is how to achieve one without sacrificing 
the other. Initial attempts to do this revolved around spatial separation of conservation areas 
(national parks, wilderness areas), where people other than tourists were largely excluded, 
from those areas occupied by local people, in which the widespread modification or 
transformation of land cover in pursuit of development could occur. This ‘fortress’ approach 
to conservation has been widely criticized as being unsustainable, because of the pressures on 
the reserves from people living along the boundaries, demands for the restitution of land from 
people who were displaced when the reserves were established, and the cost of managing 
these pressures. In turn, development is retarded by the alienation of local people from 
important resource areas in the reserves, which could be used to underwrite economic and 
social change, and their exclusion from political decision-making processes about how the 
conservation areas should be used (Adams and Hulme, 2001). As an alternative, integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDP) or, more broadly, community conservation 
initiatives1 have been proposed. These involve local people participating both physically and 
politically in the process of conservation while pursuing a development agenda, principally 
through some form of sustained use of natural resources. The underlying assumption is that 
this will provide the necessary incentives to conserve the resources and their environment. 
The corresponding hypothesis is that there are circumstances where conservation concerns 
and community interests in development converge and it becomes possible to achieve both. 
The track record of such presumed “win-win” situations has been patchy at best. Some 
                                                 
1 Adams and Hulme (2001: 13) define community conservation as “those principles and practices that argue that 
conservation goals should be pursued by strategies that emphasize the role of local residents in decision-making 
about natural resources”. Such initiatives span a wide range of conservation interventions that include co-
management, parks outreach, and resource sharing (Jones and Murphree, 2004). 
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believe that these initiatives have provided neither sustained development nor lasting 
conservation benefits (e.g. Barrett and Arcese, 1995; Gartlan, 1998). 
In recent years, the reality of a trade-off between conservation goals and development 
imperatives has become more widely recognized. This has given rise to a concept that, to 
maintain the supply of environmental goods and services for society more generally, 
incentives are needed to induce local people to forego more disruptive land- and resource-use 
practices. Such goods and services (usually contracted to the term ‘services’) include the 
production of ‘clean’ water in desired quantities, the storage of carbon in vegetation and soils, 
and the maintenance of both biodiversity and the aesthetic qualities of landscapes, primarily 
‘landscape beauty’ but also including other facets of landscapes from which people can derive 
pleasure (see Pagiola et al., 2005, for a recent review). Such environmental services 
commonly exist as positive externalities or uncompensated benefits to users because 
conventional markets generally fail to value them in ways that recompense land managers for 
providing them. As a result, the production of these services over time has become 
progressively degraded (Pagiola et al., 2005). To counter this trend, attempts have been made 
to establish values for these services and reward land managers accordingly, to encourage 
them to undertake forms of land use that are compatible with the continued supply or 
restoration of these services. 
The underlying assumption here is that the conversion of land from its natural state is 
largely a function of the net economic benefits that accrue to the land user by so doing. To the 
individual land user, maintaining the land in its natural state is seldom a more attractive 
option than its conversion for agricultural, forestry or industrial purposes. Therefore, to be an 
effective resource management instrument, the inducements offered to the land user to retain 
natural habitat must be sufficient to change the net benefits so that they outweigh the 
alternative of conversion. These inducements are widely termed ‘payments for environmental 
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services’ (PES), though they need not necessarily have to involve direct payments of money . 
No generally accepted definition of PES exists, though Wunder (2005) has proposed that a 
payment for environmental services is a voluntary transaction in which a well-defined 
environmental service (ES) or land use likely to secure that service is being “bought” by a 
minimum of one service buyer who, in return, compensates a minimum of one service 
provider, if and only if the ES provider secures that ES (i.e. payment is conditional on 
production of the ES) – italics in the original, though it has been slightly reworded.  
If PES really is a novel approach, as is implied by various recent reviews (Ferraro and 
Kiss, 2002; Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002), then one might predict a period of 
experimentation and adaptation before the approach enters the mainstream of development 
options. Are there any long-standing precursors to PES from which one might be able to learn 
lessons about implementation, performance, outcomes and possible adaptations? One possible 
initiative is the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE), started in the late 1980s in Zimbabwe and widely emulated elsewhere in 
southern Africa in the following decade. The underlying philosophy of these initiatives places 
them firmly within the ‘community conservation’ paradigm, but in their functioning they 
share many features with PES. 
In this paper, we explore some lessons learned from CAMPFIRE, which may help in the 
development of PES. We argue that there is more in common between the two approaches 
than is commonly acknowledged. The actors and language may be different, but many of the 
ideas and principles are the same. More generally, community conservation and PES both 
play out in analogous institutional landscapes, and are subject to similar external pressures. 
We therefore briefly describe the background and evolution of CAMPFIRE in the next 
section, identifying some of the key features of the programme.  Following this, we look more 
closely at some of the variation in form and functioning that emerged over time, why this 
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happened, and how these might relate to PES. In the penultimate section we draw some 
lessons from CAMPFIRE that we believe are applicable to PES, and which will need to be 
taken into account if that program is to move from articulate rhetoric to successful practice. 
We conclude by looking forward to some emerging issues for both approaches. Given the 
political, economic and social changes in recent years in Zimbabwe, which have affected all 
facets of life, we limit our quantitative assessments of CAMPFIRE largely to the period 1989-
2001, though we reflect on the resilience of the program in responding to the more recent 
upheavals.    
 
2. What is CAMPFIRE? 
 
The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources – CAMPFIRE – 
is a programme developed largely around the concept of managing wildlife and wildlife 
habitat in the communal lands of Zimbabwe for the benefit of the people living in these areas. 
Its details were first elaborated in 1986 (Martin, 1986) though its foundations were 
established about 25 years earlier when the commercial possibilities of wildlife production in 
Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) were being explored (Dassman and Mossman, 1961; Dassman, 
1964). At that time, wildlife was considered to be state property, managed by the State and 
able to be used commercially only under licence (rarely given). The resulting alienation of 
wildlife from both commercial and communal land farmers led both groups to consider 
wildlife as a pest. Explicit actions were often taken to remove animals that were considered a 
threat to crops or direct competitors for grazing with domestic livestock. More broadly, 
wildlife was threatened by the widespread transformation of natural habitats to agricultural 
land, even in agriculturally marginal areas. The State itself undertook massive wildlife 
eradication programmes in corridors on the borders of the country in an attempt to halt the 
spread of tsetse fly (Glossina spp), the vector for the livestock and occasionally human 
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disease trypanosomiasis. In short, the future of substantial numbers of wildlife outside 
demarcated conservation areas was bleak.  
Initial efforts to utilize wildlife commercially focused on meat production, on the 
assumption that wildlife would be better adapted and therefore more productive than domestic 
livestock, at least in semi-arid environments. As the wildlife industry developed, however, it 
became apparent that the economic advantages of wildlife lay less in the biological 
productivity of the species than in the many different ways that value could be added to the 
basic product in the form of services offered to the end user. Because these services can be 
added at little environmental cost, and because consumers are generally willing to pay well 
for them, wildlife utilization has become an industry with the potential to be both ecologically 
sustainable and economically viable (Child, 1988).  
The subsequent diversification and expansion of the industry was helped greatly by the 
introduction of the 1975 Parks and Wild Life Act. Among other things, this granted private 
landholders the right to use the wildlife on their land for their own benefit, including through 
safari hunting and the capture and sale of animals. Contrary to many expectations at the time, 
the wildlife industry flourished: in 1960 there were only three game ranches, totalling 350 
km2, all producing venison. By the early 1990s, this had risen to over 216 ranches extending 
over 37,000 km2 and engaged variously in sport hunting, trophy hunting, photographic safaris, 
game-viewing tourism, game cropping for venison, and selling live animals. Many farmers 
shifted partly or completely to game farming when, after independence in 1980, the 
Government of Zimbabwe reduced the levels of subsidies to commercial farmers in favour of 
greater support to the hitherto largely neglected communal farming sector. This withdrawal of 
subsidies, together with the over-valued exchange rate, which effectively taxed commercial 
livestock producers, stimulating a search for alternative land uses. Wildlife production, which 
was not controlled by the State, became financially more attractive. By 1990, wildlife 
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production had become a major land use in commercial farming areas in the arid and semi-
arid zones, where it was proving to be generally a more financially and economically viable 
form of land use when compared with single species livestock production (Jansen, et al, 
1992). This process reached its climax with the development of the Save Valley Conservancy 
(SVC) in south-eastern Zimbabwe in the mid 1990s, where the owners of 29 ranches, totalling 
over 3,500 km2 agreed on a common approach to wildlife management and the complete 
removal of livestock and much of the livestock-associated infrastructure, primarily fences. 
Whereas the opportunities created by the 1975 Parks and Wild Life Act were initially 
limited to private land, at that time mostly owned by settlers of European origin, they were 
extended to the communal farming areas after independence. In 1982, the government 
amended the Act to enable rural communities to obtain Appropriate Authority to utilize 
wildlife for commercial gain. Apart from removing obviously discriminatory provisions in the 
Act, proposed changes were, in part, an effort by the Department of National Parks and Wild 
Life Management (DNPWLM), to replicate the success on privately-owned commercial 
farmland of wildlife as a form of land use. At that time there was no particular model as to 
how this could happen without threatening the resource base, though a group of ecologists 
within the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM) were 
exploring options within the framework of an integrated land-use plan for the communal lands 
bordering a number of national parks and safari areas in northern Zimbabwe. This area 
supported substantial numbers of wild animals, including some that were commercially 
valuable (e.g. elephant, Loxodonta africana, buffalo, Syncerus caffer, lion, Panthera leo, and 
leopard, Panthera pardalis), but which were threatened by ongoing expansion of agricultural 
land-use, much of it low yielding and used mainly for subsistence purposes.  
One initiative was Project WINDFALL – Wildlife Industries for All – in which revenue in 
the form of trophy fees and lease fees paid by mostly-foreign hunters operating in the 
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communal lands, together with money from the sale of ivory and skins of animals shot while 
crop raiding, was paid to government on behalf of communities. This money was meant to be 
paid out for approved development projects within the district concerned, though in reality 
many of these projects were implemented away from the areas from which the revenues came 
and where the people had to bear the cost of wildlife damage. Although these communities 
benefited to some extent from the distribution of meat from animals culled in the adjacent 
national parks or killed while crop raiding in their area, this was insufficient incentive to 
encourage a measure of tolerance towards wildlife. Moreover, the people took no part in 
making decisions about the use and management of these wildlife resources. As a result, 
WINDFALL was not a sustained success. The main lesson to emerge was that any future 
initiative for wildlife management in the communal lands would have to transfer significant 
rights to the landholders (Martin 1986, Child 1995).  
The CAMPFIRE concept was developed largely in response to the realization that unless 
people living adjacent to or within wildlife habitat can realize value from wildlife, other forms 
of land use will eventually replace it, as has happened in most parts of the world and was 
happening in Zimbabwe. For people to tolerate the presence of elephant, buffalo, lions, 
leopards and other species, and be prepared to put up with the threats to life and property that 
this entails, they would have to benefit much more directly and substantially. They would also 
need to have a much greater say in how those benefits would be derived, as well as a stake in 
the future of wildlife through management inputs. Giving back to people substantial 
proprietorship over wildlife was also seen to be an important step in re-empowering them to 
take greater control over the mode and tempo of their development, and to build the necessary 
institutional arrangements and structures to serve this.   
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From these perspectives, CAMPFIRE is normally classed as community based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) programme and therefore can be considered a variant of 
community conservation.  The original objectives of the programme were:  
1. To initiate a programme for the long-term development, management, and sustainable 
utilization of natural resources in the Communal Areas. 
2. To achieve management of resources by placing custody and responsibility with the 
resident communities. 
3. To allow communities to benefit directly from the exploitation of natural resources within 
the Communal Areas.  
4. To establish the administrative and institutional structures necessary to make the 
programme work.  
5. To establish an Agency under the appropriate Ministry with the following responsibilities: 
(i) to negotiate the entry of communities to the programme; 
(ii) to assist each community in devising appropriate management strategies to the 
natural resources in their area; 
(iii) to provide, through a foundation grant, the initial capital funding required for 
communities to embark on an agreed programme; 
(iv) to provide, through participation funds, the means to implement sound utilisation 
schemes; 
(v) to provide ongoing technical assistance in management and financial accounting. 
6. To promote good land use and lifestyles in harmony with the natural constraints of 
marginal areas, and to operate within a regional context where the programme is 
coordinated between participating communities (Martin, 1986). 
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As originally conceived, CAMPFIRE focused on four major natural resources: wildlife, 
woodlands, water and grazing. In practice, however, the use of wildlife has been paramount 
since its realisable value is so much greater at present. The original programme envisaged 
communities voluntarily forming Natural Resource Co-operatives responsible for managing 
the resources in a defined Communal Resource Area, the boundaries of which would be 
determined by the appropriate authorities. Income from the use of the natural resources of the 
area, as well as any shared revenue derived from adjacent State lands, would accrue directly 
to the Co-operative, which in turn would establish an agreed system for handling income and 
expenditure. Benefits would be paid out to those holding shares in the Co-operative, primarily 
the residents of the area who would be issued shares at the time the Cooperative was set up.  
An administrative structure, compatible with the existing local government administrative 
structure based on District Councils and their respective Ward and Village development 
committees would in turn be set up to oversee the programme (Martin, 1986). 
The manner in which the various CAMPFIRE initiatives have developed has departed 
somewhat from these proposals for both practical and philosophical reasons. The first two 
District Councils were designated as the relevant authority for the management of wildlife in 
their districts by the then-Minister of Natural Resources in 1989. These and 10 other District 
Councils were then granted Appropriate Authority status in 1991 (SI 12/ 1991 and 61/1991). 
The extended period between the legislative change (1982), the first formal articulation of 
CAMPFIRE (1986) and its actual implementation has been attributed to jockeying for 
position and the tension between the major government stakeholders over the revenue flows. 
In particular, there was concern about devolving the responsibility for receiving and 
distributing revenues to the producer communities through the proposed Natural Resource 
Co-operatives. Government was only prepared to devolve financial and administrative 
authority (‘Appropriate Authority’) to the District Councils, the lowest accountable tier of 
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government. This decision, instead of that to invest authority in the Natural Resource Co-
operatives, has been described as a strategic compromise (Murphree, 1997). The District 
Councils opposed the formation of the co-operatives, seeing them as a threat to their own 
authority and financial viability by effectively administering large areas of communal land 
and receiving revenues directly, rather than through government-controlled structures. In 
return, the District Councils undertook to pass on to the producer communities a fixed 
percentage of the revenues earned. The agreed but non-binding guidelines were that not less 
than 50 % was to be paid to the communities (in the form of Wards2), not more than 35 % 
allocated to wildlife management (habitat management, fire control, monitoring, hiring of 
game scouts etc.), while 15 % could be retained by the District Councils as an administrative 
levy. In the longer term, however, DNPWLM intend a greater proportion (80%) to be returned 
to the producer communities, with corresponding reductions in the amounts allocated to 
programme management (15%) and general administration (5% ) (B.A. Child, 1995).  
The actual arrangements for using the wildlife resource commercially has also varied. 
Some Districts have opted to auction concession areas to safari companies, which in turn pay 
and annual concession fee and a trophy fee for each animal shot. This has engendered 
considerable competition among safari operators, with the longer-term concessions attracting 
disproportionately higher bids. Some communities3 have entered into joint-venture 
partnerships with a safari operator, with the net profit being shared according prior agreement. 
Other communities, mainly those with limited wildlife attractions, have established locally-
                                                 
2 A ward is a sub-district administrative unit comprising, on average, six villages, with each village in turn 
comprising approximately 100 households. 
3 The term ‘community’ is used here to refer to a group of people living together in a common social setting in 
which they interact frequently and regularly. Use of the term in this context does not necessarily imply any unity 
of background, organization or purpose. Most CAMPFIRE communities are heterogeneous entities, socially, 
economically and in many other ways.    
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controlled enterprises (hiring their own professional hunter to support clients, or establishing 
campsites and facilities for eco-tourism). 
At its peak, CAMPFIRE encompassed 14 separate main initiatives over 46,000 km2 of 
communal land in 13 administrative districts. (Eleven other districts have received 
Appropriate Authority and occasional income from safari hunting, tourism and problem 
animal control but most have not manage to attract the sustained interest of safari operators, 
either for hunting or eco-tourism.)  Between 1989 and 2001, CAMPFIRE revenue in these 
districts amounted to more than US$ 19.8 million, 49 % of which has been disbursed to 
communities (140 wards and over 130,000 households), 20 % used for wildlife management, 
just over 12 % retained by the District Councils as a levy, 3 % used for other expenses 
(including the 1.5 % levy to the CAMPFIRE Association – see below), while about 15 % is 
still being held by the RDCs pending allocation (Khumalo, 2003).  Almost 90 % of this 
income has come from safari hunting, just under 6 % from the sale of ivory and hides of 
culled animals (mostly elephant), and just over 2 % each from tourism and the sale of other 
natural products. The low return from other natural resources is partly because policies in 
other sectors such as forestry and mining make no provision for the payment of stumpage fees 
or royalties to rural communities, but mainly because of  the relatively low value of most 
other natural products, or the difficulties of adding appropriate value for distant and 
discerning overseas markets. 
As a result of this diversity and innovation, CAMPFIRE has long been considered the 
flagship CBNRM programme in southern Africa, attracting much public and academic 
interests globally, most of it strongly supportive but some of it critical (e.g. Barrett and 
Arcese, 1995; G.T.F. Child, 1995; Hill, 199; Duffey, 2000; Adams and Hulme, 2001; Jones 
and Murphree, 2001, 2004). As a result, there is now a wealth of knowledge and experience 
on the management and sustained use of wildlife by communities (Child, 2004).  
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3. CAMPFIRE and Payments for Environmental Services 
 
CAMPFIRE was never conceived of as a payment-for-environmental-services programme. 
Environmental services were generally considered as a positive and uncompensated 
externality from maintaining natural landscapes in ecologically fragile areas prone to high 
levels of soil erosion (Bond, 1999). Nevertheless, it exhibits many PES-like features. The 
programme was set up to address issues of sub-optimal land use, at least from a broader 
societal perspective4, through creating economic incentives for land users to protect natural 
habitat and associated wildlife in areas considered to be marginal for agricultural 
development. The widespread conversion of land in these areas was seen as the core reason 
for the loss of wildlife and wildlife habitat (Child, 2004). As such, the original concept of 
CAMPFIRE was underpinned by an explicitly conservationist agenda, with issues of human 
well-being and rural development being seen as the means to achieving its objectives. Once 
CAMPFIRE was established, however, rural development concerns became more prominent, 
even to the point for some where conservation-oriented concerns became the means to 
achieving human-development ends  (Jones and Murphree, 2001). The fulcrum on which 
these competing interests are balanced is the rural institutional and organisational framework. 
It too has developed over time to become an objective in its own right, driven by the need to 
accommodate internal diversity, individual ambition, and shifts in influence and authority, 
both locally and in larger-scale institutions. This co-evolution of organizational structure and 
institutional functioning has been critical in the ongoing process of community empowerment, 
allowing people to discover and explore options, and choose among them (Murphree, 2004). 
 
                                                 
4 From the perspective of the individual land user, however, the current land use may often be the most rational 
and rewarding under prevailing personal circumstances. 
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3.1. Actors and services  
 
The principal actors in CAMPFIRE are the producer communities, the Rural District 
Councils of which the communities are part (and which is authorised by government to 
receive revenue from the use of wildlife under the CAMPFIRE scheme), and the safari or eco-
tourism operators, who enter into various contractual arrangements with the communities 
through the RDC and then market the opportunities for hunting or eco-tourism to mostly 
foreign clients. These interactions in turn have been facilitated by a loose consortium of third 
parties who helped initiate the programme, provide technical advice, and reconcile the 
different interests of the principals. The original CAMPFIRE proposal envisaged the 
formation of a CAMPFIRE Agency to help implement projects and develop the programme, 
but this body was never set up or funded. Instead, individuals from government (mainly 
DNPWLM, the main regulatory agency), academia (Center for Applied Social Studies, 
CASS, at the University of Zimbabwe) and the NGO sector (World Wide Fund for Nature, 
WWF,  and Zimbabwe Trust, a rural development NGO) formed the CAMPFIRE 
Collaborative Group (CCG), to assist with programme development. The CCG in turn helped 
to set up the CAMPFIRE Association (CA) to represent those RDCs with Appropriate 
Authority. By 1992, the CA had assumed the leadership of the CCG, and by 1998 it was 
acting for over 30 RDCs and smaller community groups (Maveneke, 1998).  
The CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group, both jointly and in their separate capacities, also 
served as channels for funding from bilateral donors such as the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD), and the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA, now the 
Department for International Development, DFID). This funding enabled the costs to be met 
of administering projects, providing technical assistance, purchasing and maintaining capital 
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equipment (vehicles, electric fencing), and partly underwriting recurrent expenditure, at least 
during the early years of the programme. It is doubtful if CAMPFIRE would have got off the 
ground without this initial support, more so given the fact that rural communities have almost 
no access to credit and therefore would not have been able to sustain the initial start-up costs. 
Most importantly, the CCG lobbied extensively for the changes in policies and statutes that 
made it possible for the initiative to evolve from its uncertain beginning. CAMPFIRE was 
launched in the face of opposition from some sectors of government and strong doubts on the 
part of others. By promoting CAMPFIRE consistently and coherently, both nationally and 
internationally, the CCG convinced many that the initiative was a necessary experiment that 
deserved support. 
Finally, the technical assistance given to RDCs by organisations such as WWF, CASS and 
ZimTrust greatly improved how CAMPFIRE functioned. Broadly accountable and transparent 
institutions evolved. Communities became empowered to demand their rights, though not all 
issues (e.g. land tenure) have yet been resolved. The efficiency of CAMPFIRE operations 
improved considerably. By encouraging an open competitive bidding process through asking 
for tenders for concession areas, the RDCs were able to attract more bids and ensure that the 
full market value of the resource was realised, thereby reducing the potential for rent capture. 
The tender process drove prices upwards (Table 4), as did the procedure of interviewing 
operators interested in securing a contract (WWF, 1997). In short, these intermediary 
organisations were crucial in the initial phases of CAMPFIRE. 
 
3.2. Scale issues 
 
As national programme, CAMPFIRE has grown substantially since the first two districts 
were granted Appropriate Authority in 1989. By 2002, the CAMPFIRE Association 
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represented 35 Rural District Councils, covering over 244,000 km2 and supporting some 
777,000 households, though only 12 of these districts had a consistently marketable quota of 
wildlife for hunting or some other sellable natural attraction. These latter districts encompass 
238 wards and over 254,000 households (1992 national census figures) over areas totalling 
68,000 km2. Within this, however, the actual wildlife production areas are restricted to about 
94 wards covering ~34,000 km2 and supporting about 85,400 households. CAMPFIRE has 
not been a trivial undertaking in terms of scale of operation. 
The underlying assumption of CAMPFIRE is that benefits derived from the use of wildlife, 
either through hunting or eco-tourism, can create sufficient incentive both for communities 
and for individual households within them to modify or limit their use of land in appropriate 
ways. But the measure of incentive depends greatly on whether it is viewed at the household 
level, where the payments are usually small and intermittent, or at community and district 
levels where the aggregate amounts are obviously larger (Table 2).  For most CAMPFIRE 
communities, the small size of the payments at a household level probably does not provide 
much incentive to forego other, more immediately and individually rewarding land-use 
practices. Conversely, the aggregate amounts received from CAMPFIRE by the RDC and, in 
some cases, collectively by the community, are more compelling. As a result, there are top-
down pressures on households, and usually also on communities, to adopt prescribed patterns 
of land use, rather than these decisions being made within the communities themselves. There 
are exceptions, however (Kanyurira Ward, Guruve District: Murphree, 1997).   
 
3.3. Payments for landscape beauty  
 
Payments for landscape beauty may be the oldest form of “payments for environmental 
services” (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). The marketed commodities generally include: 
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access rights, tourism services, photographic and eco-tourism concessions, and related 
management agreements. Although the service being purchased by the buyer is the right to 
access ‘scenic beauty’, the markets in which this occurs are both physically and conceptually 
complex. The physical complexity arises from the wide range of available products, each 
differentiated by price, seasonal availability, scope of activities, modes of access etc., and 
mediated by a range of third parties – tourist operators, agents, brokers, transporters. 
Conceptual complexity arises from the differing concepts of what constitutes ‘scenic beauty’ 
and the extent to which people are able to express their preferences in this regard, and from 
the many, not mutually exclusive, reasons why governments and others establish protected 
areas. These include: to conserve biodiversity; to maintain natural ecological processes; as 
wilderness areas, to be enjoyed by a select few; as areas on which to found a viable tourism 
industry; or as areas for various kinds of outdoor recreation. In most cases such areas are 
conceived to be public goods. While the agencies responsible for them have collected visitor 
and other fees from those using the amenities, these fees have seldom fully covered the 
maintenance costs. Moreover, the income has been paid into consolidated revenue funds 
rather than being immediately available to the management agencies for their use. Only 
recently, particularly in southern Africa, has this begun to be turned around. In such cases, the 
user fees can be considered a form of environmental service payment. 
For CAMPFIRE, the concept of landscape beauty is even more complex. Only about 2 % 
of CAMPFIRE revenues have come from tourism, in contrast to hunting which has accounted 
for 90 %. While hunters no doubt appreciate the landscapes in which they hunt, their aesthetic 
pleasure comes more from the process of hunting itself, in which the landscapes are largely 
backdrop. Thus the concept of payments for landscape beauty, at least in the case of 
CAMPFIRE, need to be extended to cover hunting and other recreational activities generally 
associated with wild landscapes, rather than with specific scenic qualities of the landscapes. 
18  
 
 
3.4. Who pays?  
 
Despite the political, social and spatial diversity of those communities and districts 
involved in CAMPFIRE, a common set of financial arrangements rapidly emerged between 
the buyers and sellers of this recreational service. The central contractual arrangement is 
between the RDC, acting as the seller on behalf of its constituent communities, and one or 
more ‘safari operators’ buying the service on behalf of their future hunting clients. In most 
cases the hunting or eco-tourism rights were being leased to safari operators, with additional 
fees for each animal taken in, or tourist brought to, the area. The details of the contracts vary 
considerably, however, as each party has sought to extract maximum benefit from the 
arrangement (WWF, 1997). Early initiatives, in which RDCs acted as the safari operator, 
showed that most did not yet have the marketing and logistical skills to engage effectively in 
marketing at that time (Jansen, 1990). The market for hunting leases on the one hand, and 
clients on the other, is highly competitive, with individual skill, recognition and reputation 
being important qualities. By exploiting this competitiveness through the use of tenders and 
auctions to market leases, and by innovatively structured contracts, CAMPFIRE communities 
achieved substantial real increases in wildlife-based revenue (Bond, 1999).  
Did the landholders get a ‘fair price’  for these services? For environmental services 
generally, the potential for a genuinely competitive market to emerge – one in which there are 
multiple buyers and sellers competing openly and strongly with each other – is in many cases 
severely limited due to the biophysical setting of such services, and because of the aggregate 
nature of the demand. For example, payments for watershed services have been characterised 
as “(usually) bilaterally, mutually-negotiated agreements between representatives of the 
buyers and the sellers” (Wunder and Vargas, 2005).  
19  
 
For CAMPFIRE, the questions relates to whether the RDCs, on behalf of the producer 
communities, are getting a genuine market-related price for the natural resource that are being 
exploited. While notions of what constitutes a ‘fair price’ are all relative, the CAMPFIRE 
experience is quite clear: when hunting leases were marketed through an open, accountable 
and competitive process, the RDCs received market-related prices; conversely, when leases 
were granted using uncompetitive and unaccountable procedures, the RDCs received much 
less than the market price (Bond, 1999). It is a matter of speculation as to who captured the 
rent in such cases. 
The early contractual arrangements between the safari operators and RDCs were simple 
and based on standard government rates for leased hunting rights and the size of the quota for 
the concession area. The contract defined the relationship between the safari operator, the 
RDC and the wildlife producer communities in terms of hunting ethics, monitoring, 
infrastructural investment and in some cases employment. From the mid-1990’s more 
sophisticated contracts began to be developed with the rights and obligations of all parties 
being more clearly specified, including an implied conditionality in the link between service 
provision and payment. They were, in effect but not in name, payments for environmental 
services.  
Compliance with these arrangements has been and remains highly variable. Typically, 
RDCs lacked the capacity to fully comprehend and monitor the payments made by the safari 
operators, and frequently had to rely on the honesty of the operator. Conversely, safari 
operators seldom if ever held RDCs and the wildlife producer communities to account for 
failing to meet their contractual obligations over and above the hunting quota. Early contracts 
between safari operators and RDCs frequently featured fungible benefits such as “a good, 
used Landrover for use by the RDC”. The second-generation contracts eliminated virtually all 
these non-financial payments. Moreover, the contracts were mostly denominated in foreign 
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currency, albeit paid in Zimbabwean dollars to comply with Zimbabwe government 
regulations. This ensured that the RDCs were not compromised by the devaluation of the 
Zimbabwean dollar following various efforts at economic structural adjustment. Most 
recently, in view of the failure of many RDCs to pass on to communities their full share of 
CAMPFIRE revenues (see below), resulting in community dissatisfaction which threatens the 
whole initiative (including the RDCs’ revenue streams), some safari operators have taken to 
paying communities their dividend directly, and then remitting to the RDCs their share in turn 
(Russell Taylor, WWF SARPO, pers. comm.). This on-going adaptiveness of all parties is a 
key feature of CAMPFIRE. 
 
3.5. Financial and economic data 
 
Between 1989 and 2001, RDCs earned a total of US$ 20.29 million from wildlife-based 
activities (Table 3). Of this total, 89 per cent has been from leases with private sector safari 
operators, about 6 per cent from the sale of hides and ivory, with the balance from tourism 
(photographic safaris: just over 2 per cent) and other miscellaneous activities. Of the revenue 
earned from safari hunting, at least 60 per cent can be attributed to hunting elephant, both 
through trophy fees and the daily rate paid by hunters when in the field  (Bond, 1999). The 
development of photographic tourism within the communal lands has been constrained by the 
fragmented nature of most of the wildlife habitat and, relative to the protected areas of 
Zimbabwe, low wildlife population densities. 
Wildlife revenue is allocated annually, in arrears, to wildlife producer wards, to wildlife 
management activities and to a council levy. At a national level, the guidelines on the 
disbursement of CAMPFIRE revenue (see section 2) have been largely met (Table 4). At the 
level of individual districts, however, the extent of disbursement has been highly variable. 
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The cumulative unallocated funds over the period 1989-2001 in one district, Gokwe North, 
amount to 65.5% of all funds received, while Gazaland District, the smallest CAMPFIRE 
operation, serving only two wards, unallocated funds come to only 1.1% of total receipts! 
Over the 12 main CAMPFIRE districts, an average 17.1% of funds received over this period 
have not been paid out. 
Quantifying the financial benefits from CAMPFIRE is complicated by factors such as the 
size of the programme; the increasing number of participating districts (and therefore people) 
over time; and the variability among both districts and wards. Nevertheless, the financial 
benefits can be considered at four levels: the safari operators; rural district councils; wards; 
and households. Of these, the economics of the safari operations are least well understood, 
despite the volume of research on CAMPFIRE. Initially, it was assumed that as Zimbabwe’s 
share of the international trophy hunting market was growing, and as operators were 
competing for leases and benefiting from the expanding hunting opportunities in the 
communal lands, no immediate information was required. The move to competitive marketing 
of wildlife leases may have reduced the profitability of their activities compared with previous 
arrangements, but has probably forced increases in efficiency to compensate. 
As the legal authority for wildlife, RDCs acts as the gate-keeper for all wildlife revenue. 
For most RDCs, the CAMPFIRE revenues were a new and significant source of funds coming 
at a time when the central government, being urged to devolve authority, also took the 
opportunity to shed some of its fiscal responsibilities. Wildlife revenues typically constitute 
0 - 24% of all locally earned income, though in several districts it has exceeded all other 
forms of local income and government grants (Bond, 1999).  Between 1989 and 1999, the 
RDCs overall retained US$5.63 million (29%) of the income from wildlife, not including that 
set aside for wildlife management (US$ 4.08 million: Table 3). Of this, the RDCs’ retained 
almost exactly what they were due under the CAMPFIRE guidelines (US$ 2.51 million, 
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14.6%), but they have also benefited from the investment income from the remaining 
unallocated funds that they hold. The communities have had to bear the opportunity costs of 
this unpaid money and, given the present hyperinflationary conditions in the country, when it 
is eventually paid, it will be worth a lot less. (The RDCs have also benefited substantially and 
indirectly from technical support, training and the provision of equipment but by how much is 
unrecorded.)   
Wards were created by government as sub-district level planning and development entities, 
though they have no means of raising revenue. Effectively, they have never progressed 
beyond being units for political representation at the district level. With the devolution of 
revenue through CAMPFIRE the wards had for the first time financial resources with which 
to become potentially effective units of development. Between 1989 and 2001, almost 
US$ 9.9 million was devolved to a total of 143 wards. As with RDCS, wards also benefited 
substantially from infrastructural investment and training by donor and supporting agencies.  
Estimates of the benefit per household are largely speculative, being calculated from the 
revenue received at ward level and available population data. (Only in some cases are there 
clear accounts of how much was paid to households: Child and Peterson, 1991; Bond 1991). 
Calculated this way the gross financial benefits among wards are highly skewed and generally 
very low.  Between 1995 and 1999 the median benefit varied from US$ 2.2 in 1998 (range 
US$ 0.2 - 252.3, n = 86 ) to US$ 5.8 in 1999 (range US$ 0.2 - 197.5, n = 100: Figure 1). 
Compared with the benefits obtained from agricultural production, the income from wildlife 
in most wards is purely supplementary (Bond, 1999; Logan and Mosely, 2001). Nevertheless, 
such national-level analyses conceal the occasional substantial financial benefit, sometimes 
exceeding the estimated gross income from all agricultural sources (Bond, 1999).  
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3.6. Additionality and establishing baseline measurements 
 
Additionality refers to the changes in the state of the natural resource as a result of the 
payments made.  CAMPFIRE was developed with the specific purpose of conserving wildlife 
and wildlife habitat in the communal lands of Zimbabwe (Martin, 1986), and so wildlife or 
ecological indicators could be one measure of performance from which additionality can be 
calculated. From a development perspective the redistribution of power and the formation of 
effective units of common property management (Hulme and Murphree, 2001) are also 
performance indicators.  
Formal ecological monitoring has been undertaken by censusing large mammals and using 
remote sensing to detect land-use changes. Aerial censuses of large mammals have been 
conducted in the major protected areas and the communal lands of the Sebungwe Region5 
since the early 1980s. These data show that while the total number of elephant in this region 
has remained more or less constant, there have been significant changes in their distribution 
(Dunham and Mackie, 2003). This is particularly significant in the Gokwe District, where 
substantial areas of prime wildlife habitat have been converted to settlement and agricultural 
lands over the last 20 years (Cumming, 1997), though in the context of the region as a whole, 
the changes are relatively small. Quantifying these changes using remote sensing has been 
hampered by the lack of extensive (and expensive) ground-based verification (Dunham and 
Mackie, 2003). The unverified remote sensing studies at a regional scale (area ~18,000 km2) 
do not consistently pick up the variability of the landscape and the patterns of settlement and 
land use, all of which affect wildlife production (Dunham, Davies and Muhwandagara, 2003). 
                                                 
5 Three major RDCs are located in the Sebungwe Region: Nyaminyami, Binga and Gokwe North. 
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The alternative is to use gross wildlife revenue as a proxy for wildlife production6. This shows 
a negative exponential relationship between wildlife productivity and human population 
density, suggesting that there is the competition between wildlife and farmers for key habitats 
(principally riverine areas with alluvial soils) and water within the larger landscape (Bond, 
1999).   
While there are indications of continuing habitat loss, this does not mean that the payments 
have had no impact. For example, in Gokwe District, the wildlife corridor that was established  
in 1990 has remained largely intact with only minor encroachment at the margins. In other 
areas, communities have implemented decisions that have consolidated settlement and created 
wildlife habitat. Almost as important as establishing a baseline against future changes can be 
measured is a need to understand of the processes leading to change. An analysis of land-use 
planning decisions in eight districts between 1989 and 1993 showed that these were mostly 
imposed on local communities by the RDCs, for whom wildlife revenue had become 
significant (Bond, 1999). 
 
3.7. Permanence, accounting and leakage 
 
The legislative changes that have allowed the development of wildlife as a form of land 
use on private and communal land in Zimbabwe have no time limitation and can potentially 
continue indefinitely. Nevertheless, although CAMPFIRE was conceived as a long-term 
programme rather than a series of short-term payments, permanence is by no means 
guaranteed. The policy and legislative changes that allowed payments to be made to RDCs 
and wildlife producer communities is increasingly under threat from gradual or wholesale re-
                                                 
6 The sample used wards in which revenue was allocated on the ‘producer ward’ principle, rather than spread 
among all wards in a district irrespective of their contribution to CAMPFIRE revenues. 
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centralisation. Moreover, changes in the relative market prices of wildlife and agricultural 
commodities could easily still change, and in some cases has, land-use practices (for example, 
the widespread transformation of land in the Zambezi Valley to cotton cultivation). Factors 
that might lead to relative price changes include: genetic modifications of livestock and key 
crops (cotton); reduced demand for wildlife-based tourism resulting from local and global 
instability, high oil prices or changing consumer tastes; and climate change7.  
Within the southern Africa, most CBNRM initiatives are based on policy and legislative 
changes that have devolved some proprietorship over wildlife and wildlife habitat to 
communal land farmers. A core issue has been how to interpret these legislative changes. In 
their enthusiasm and desire to initiate CAMPFIRE, advocates of community conservation 
approaches may have assumed that they shared a vision of local empowerment with central 
and district governments, but the reality is that the relative financial success of CAMPFIRE 
has opened up opportunities for rent-seeking on the part of individuals and covert taxation on 
the part of government (Bond 1999, Murphree 1993). In short, different stakeholders have 
competing interests in relation to the CAMPFIRE revenues (and, in some cases, the ancillary 
donor funds that have been attracted to support CAMPFIRE). Within CAMPFIRE, the 
Government has sided with the RDCs against the wildlife producer communities in terms of 
the share of revenue that the RDCs can appropriate8.  Linked to this has been a gradual 
recentralisation by government of some provisions of these initiatives, inadvertently 
supported by some publications claiming that community conservation programmes have 
failed and that a return to protectionism is required (e.g. Barrett and Arcese, 1995). 
                                                 
7 For the large sale commercial farmers on private land in South Africa and Namibia, the greatest short-term 
challenge will be the re-distribution of land by authorities that do not support or recognise wildlife as a 
legitimate and appropriate form of land use (Bond, 2004). 
8 Bond and Cumming (in press) document the extensive policy and advocacy efforts by the CAMPFIRE 
Collaborative Group (CCG), which still failed to change the levels of proprietorship of communal land farmers 
over wildlife and wildlife habitat. 
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Regarding ‘leakage’ – the transfer and intensification of human impacts to other places 
caused by a lessening of impact in CAMPFIRE areas – this is likely in the long term, though 
accounting for such impacts will be difficult, given the large areas covered by CAMPFIRE 
and the inevitability of other, unrelated, changes (e.g. changes in transport networks, 
agricultural opportunities, and demographic change).  
 
3.8. Participation of marginal groups  
Relatively little detailed work has been done on the intra-community and intra-household 
impacts of CAMPFIRE. As indicated earlier, the wildlife revenues received by households 
have generally been supplementary to other income sources (though none of these is large). 
Thus a direct, financial, impact on poverty, especially of the poorest people in society, has 
probably been marginal at best.  
Nevertheless, CAMPFIRE has had a major impact on proprietorship of communities, 
engendering a sense that they have valuable resources at their disposal. The discussions and 
negotiations around CAMPFIRE have helped to build confidence and skills in negotiating and 
managing conflicts. It remains to be seen if these attributes can be used to advantage in other 
fora 
On the negative side, there is largely anecdotal evidence of the benefits in many producers 
communities be captured or manipulated by elites to their individual advantage. These include 
nepotic employment practices and appropriation of project equipment for personal use. Some 
ethnic groups such as the Tonga, vaDema and Shangwe have been marginalised in much of 
the decision-making, even though they are often the original inhabitants of these remote areas. 
Women are also generally marginalised, and their needs and concerns overlook (Sithole and 
Frost, 2002). Countering these tendencies will be a significant challenge for CAMPFIRE in 
the future. 
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4. Lessons for PES 
 
What lessons that can be drawn from the CAMPFIRE experience that might be important 
for the emerging PES schemes? We suggest the following principles: 
• Form should follow function. There is too often the tendency to design projects for rural 
communities, including establish organisational structures and institutional 
arrangements, before there is any real functioning for such features to serve. 
CAMPFIRE was no different at the outset but the original plans soon got left behind as 
people focused of getting activities going on the ground. 
• Be flexible. There is too much uncertainty to make it practical to adopt rigid rules and 
procedures. The evident flexibility of CAMPFIRE is one of its major strengths, since it 
has allowed considerable variation in functioning to emerge. From this adaptive 
solutions to differing social, environmental and other circumstances can materialize. By 
not insisting on rigid adherence to some preconceived plan, those who promoted the 
CAMPFIRE concept ensured that local communities and outside interests could forge 
relationships that they thought best fitted their circumstances at the time. In so doing, a 
much greater sense of local ownership and commitment was developed. No doubt, PES 
schemes will be similar, if allowed to follow the same route. Nevertheless, there are 
some instances where more structure would be advantageous. For example, the lack of a 
clear legal framework governing tenure, property rights and responsibilities for 
receiving and distributing funds has exposed CAMPFIRE communities to the vagaries 
of administrative whim and selective interpretation. 
• Promote diversity. Although each CAMPFIRE initiative is based on the same 
fundamental plan laid down within a common regulatory environment, they all differ 
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importantly in the details of their development and outcomes to date. Variation in 
environmental and social settings, timing (in relation to the experience of others and to 
changing national economic and political circumstances), and the nature of external 
advice and advisors, all provided subtly different selective environments in which these 
initiatives evolved. Along with flexibility, that diversity was CAMPFIRE’s strength, 
allowing natural selection to take place, both within and among the various initiatives 
over time. No doubt, selection will continue to operate. 
• Recognise the complexity of the institutional landscape. That within which CAMPFIRE 
is evolving is considerably more complex that the simple configuration of a seller and a 
buyer of an environmental service, perhaps with an intermediary organization 
facilitating the transaction. First, there are existing institutional arrangements and 
structures, including traditional leadership and mechanisms for making decisions and 
managing disputes. Building on these rather than side-lining them would seem to be 
sensible. Second, there are other interests which need to co-opted, negotiated with and, 
if necessary, countered. Agent-based models provide a good paradigm for such settings. 
Third, at least for CAMPFIRE there were real markets for the services, so these did not 
have to be developed. Moreover, in most cases there was more than one buyer vying for 
the right to operate a concession, creating competition among them, but also the option 
to participate in bidding for more than one concession area, thereby fostering 
competition in turn among the service suppliers 
• Success and failure are relative. It is somewhat invidious to talk of success and failure as 
if these are absolutes. Success can be ephemeral; failure no more than a temporary 
setback, if the lessons to be learned are applied in turning things around. Each 
CAMPFIRE initiative has been, in essence, an experiment. Learning and applying the 
lessons from each is crucial to the ongoing evolution of CAMPFIRE as a whole. Even 
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under the present extremely adverse economic, political and social conditions in 
Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE continues to evolve, with innovative solutions to current 
problems emerging. The lesson for PES is to strive for constant improvement, not taking 
success for granted, for external conditions will surely change, and not accepting the 
notion of absolute failure, if lessons can be learned and applied in time. 
• Complexity can be distracting. The complexity of ecological systems makes it difficult 
to establish and measure any causal relationships between “payments”, land-use change 
or ecological indicators of environmental integrity. Consequently, too much concern 
over issues of ‘additionality’, ‘leakage’ and the demonstration of causality could become 
diverting. While not wishing to understate the significance of these problems, we 
nevertheless feel that they should be kept in perspective and not allowed to stand in the 
way of implementation. 
• Remember Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. Establishing trends in complex social-
ecological systems is difficult because baseline measurements are seldom available and 
pre-project circumstances were never static anyway. Time-series data are seldom 
collected with sufficiently replicable and constant methodologies to allow for 
meaningful comparison. Even then, wide confidence limits of the estimates constrain 
precise interpretation over short timeframes.  For PES to work there needs to be an 
assurance that the changes that are being bought are being achieved. The lesson from 
CAMPFIRE is that even over an extended period of time, it is difficult to establish 
tangible, causal linkages between the payments that have been made and changes in 
land-use management. Monitoring these relationships with the necessary precision is 
likely to lead to substantial transaction costs, thereby potentially diminishing any gains 
in efficiency that might have been achieved by the market-led solution. A trade-off will 
be necessary. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Three interrelated problems currently burden CAMPFIRE arrangements (Murphree, 1995, 
1997; Jones and Murphree, 2001). First, the actual wildlife areas in the communal lands are 
not clearly demarcated and, as management units, they lack any particular economic or 
ecological rationale. Ideally, such units should be contained within the jurisdiction of a 
recognised community group, and be small and sufficiently discrete to allow for direct 
interaction, discussion and decision-making among the community members. But they should 
also be large enough to sustain a resource base that can be exploited in ways that are both 
economically viable and ecologically sustainable. Such a combination is not easily achieved. 
Second, the communal lands are organisationally complex with overlapping jurisdictions 
among various kinds of authorities (traditional, spiritual and modern), functioning at a range 
of scales. Internally, the communities are differentiated by social standing based on lineage, 
influence and relative wealth, among others, so consensus is more difficult to achieve than is 
commonly assumed. Finally, the greatest problem is the lack of clearly defined property rights 
and strong tenure at both individual and community level. People’s rights over the land and its 
resources vary with location, ranging from usufruct rights over arable land to collective rights 
elsewhere. This creates uncertainty and leads to conditional use of resources, and little or no 
investment in resource management other than that which will produce a near-immediate 
return. Moreover, as non-legal entities, the producer communities cannot enter into legally-
binding contracts, or sue or be sued. Any contracts into which they enter are subject to 
common law. Despite many calls to strengthen both communal and individual rights, backed 
up by a government-appointed commission on land tenure (Runkuni, 1994), little has 
changed. Communities and their constituents remain in legal limbo though, arguably, 
initiatives such as CAMPFIRE that will eventually require resolution of the contradictions, or 
fail in the process.  
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Table 1. Pre- and post-tender prices for hunting concession areas in three districts 
participating in CAMPFIRE (WWF, 1997) 
 
 Pre-tender price Post-tender price % increase 
Tsholotsho 108,000 280,000 159 
Hurungwe 172,000 654,000 280 
Chipinge 70,000 300,000 329 
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Table 1. The magnitude of CAMPFIRE revenues in 1999 at different levels of organisation. 
The three districts have been the most profitable ones under CAMPFIRE and 1999 was the 
most rewarding year in terms both of total CAMPFIRE income and disbursements to 
communities. These therefore represent a ‘best-case’ scenario. Monetary values in US$, 
rounded to the nearest dollar. 
 District 
Organisational level Binga1 Guruve2 Nyaminyami3 
Rural District Council 
1999 income 
Retained 
Disbursed 
% disbursed 
 
301,580 
103,368 
198,212 
65.7 
 
489,872 
349,114 
140,758 
28.7 
 
772,731 
470,429 
302,302 
39.1 
Ward 
Average 
Range 
Number of CAMPFIRE wards 
9,439 
3082 – 30,826 
21 
23,460 
0 – 56,160 
11 
25,192 
0 – 55,918 
12 
Household 
Average 
Range 
No. households (all wards) 
 
10 
3 – 35 
19,669 
 
58 
0 – 160 
5,303 
 
59 
0 – 197 
5,720 
1 The Binga RDC distributes some revenue to each ward, irrespective of whether they have 
exploitable wildlife populations or other natural attractions  
 
2 In Guruve, only 11 out of 21 wards have produced CAMPFIRE revenues during the period 
1989-2001, and then not in every year. Payments to wards reflects their contributions to 
annual revenue generation 
 
3 In Nyaminyami, all 12 wards participate in CAMPFIRE, though revenue generation varies. 
In some years a ward may produce no revenue, in which case no payments are made to it. 
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Table 2. Income earned by Rural District Councils with Appropriate Authority between 1989 
and 2001 (data from Khumalo, 2003). 
 Safari 
hunting 
Tourism Sale of hides 
and ivory 
Other Total 
Income by activity 
(US$ million) 
18.15 0.46 1.17 0.51 20.29
% of income by activity  89.5 2.3 5.7 2.5 100
 
 
 
Table 3. The allocation of wildlife revenue earned by Rural District Councils between 1989 
and 2001 (data from Khumalo, 2003)  
 Producer 
wards 
Wildlife 
management 
Council 
Levy 
Other  Unallocated Total 
Revenue allocated 
(US$ millions) 
9.89 4.08 2.51 0.68 3.13 20.29 
% of total revenue 45.9 20.5 14.6 4.7 14.3 100 
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Figure 1. Changes in the number of wards receiving CAMPFIRE revenues, and the strongly 
asymmetric nature of those revenues, for the period 1989-1999. 
